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Abstract
This study seeks a better understanding on how education is rewarded. Drawing
on the recent experiences of reforms in rural China, I estimate household net profit
function using China Household Income Project (CHIP) for 2002. I find strong support
that education influences household net profits through two channels: (1) education im-
proves allocation of factor inputs and hence increases net profits; (2) education directly
increases profits. It is estimated that an additional year of education is associated with
2.5 percent increase in net profits: 1.1 percent comes from more efficient allocation of
labor; 0.35 percent comes from better utilization of capital investment; 1.09 percent
comes directly from increasing profits. The study has potentially important policy im-
plications for completing China’s market reforms. It also sheds light on how schooling
should be financed, particularly focusing on a few rather than universal provision of
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1 Introduction
The question of whether and how education affect income are basic concerns for development
economists and policy makers. The fact that education improves one’s living perspectives
is also a strong argument for the desirability of undertaking substantial schooling invest-
ments in low-income countries and rural areas, in particular. All these initiatives points to
a consideration of one more fundamental question: How do the educated farm households
earn more? This study evaluates the effect of education on earnings in rural China dur-
ing market liberalization (1988-2002). In 2005, nominal per capita income in rural China
was 3255 RMB (roughly 626 CAD) (China Yearbook of Rural Household Survey 2006),
1.5 percent that of Canada in the same year. Despite rural China is still extremely poor
relative to Canada, per capita income growth has been impressive by international stan-
dards. Since the inception of policy reforms, real per capita income in rural China has
increased sharply during the period of 1978 and 1984, followed by a period of sustained
growth. Several factors contribute to the remarkable performance during 1978 to 1984. In
particular, the adoption of household responsibility system (HRS) and increases in state
procurement prices were identified as the major sources of income growth prior to 1984,
because it creates a profound onetime effect on earnings through increased labor effort and
price incentives (Lin, 1992). Agricultural research and technological changes are also found
to have significantly raised crop yields (Huang and Rozelle, 1996; Fan and Pardy, 1997).
These studies are primarily concerned with productivity gains within agriculture during the
early period of economic reform from 1978 to 1984. They do not explain sources of growth
subsequent to the agricultural reform.
In this study, I examine the possible role of education in explaining the changes in factor
allocation and its implication for income growth during for the period of nonagricultural
development. Starting in the mid 1980s, the government announced a series of policies
that is intended to loosen the restrictions on labor mobility out of agriculture. Despite
restrictions on rural-urban migration is still tight back to the early 1990s, farm households
are encouraged to establish nonfarm business and to seek off-farm employment with better
pay. The idea of leaving the farmland without leaving the countryside (li tu bu li xiang)
has long been regarded by the central government as the best way to absorb rural labor
surplus. During the period of 1985 and 2002, the percentage of rural labor force employed
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in the Township and Rural Enterprises (TVEs) rises from 19 percent to over 27 percent,
with the strongest growth of 22.2 percent in 1995 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). Fig-
ure 1 summarizes these changes. It generally suggests that there is a one-to-one movement
between income growth, nonagricultural labor and nonagricultural income growth. There
is a large literature on education and income in agriculture (see Jamison and van Der Gaag
(1987), Li and Li (1994), Li and Zhang (1998), Cook (1999)). Consistent with the belief
that return to education is low in absence of learning opportunities, these studies found
negative or no effect of education in raising agricultural income. Another literature focuses
on estimating the return of education in nonagricultural sector, mostly wage employment
(see Meng (1995, 2001), Li and Urmanbetova (2002), de Brauw and Rozelle (2006) and
Deng (2007)). These studies, primarily rely on Mincer equation, found positive return to
education.
By and large, the aforementioned studies evaluate the productive value of education on
earnings seperately for the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. In most cases, the re-
turn to education is evaluated in a stable and dynamic environment. Theoretically, if choice
to work in agriculture and nonagriculture are made at the optimum, the effect of education
is reflected solely on its effect on total output. Seperately estimating wage functions for
both sectors precisely captures the total contribution of education to earnings. However,
this might not be true if rural households are constrained from making optimal decisions
due to imperfections of the markets and the presence of policy controls. This study sug-
gests that education might well impact earnings by adjusting the allocation of factor inputs
between agriculture and nonagriculture. The concept of allocation is not new in the human
capital literature. For example, education enhances the farmers’ ability to deal with market
disequilibria (see Schultz (1975) and Rosenzweig (1995)). Education may also improvefarm
allocation decision as well as workers’ production skills (Welch (1970)).
To facilitate interpretation, I set up a analytic framework, in which households maximize
net profits from production that takes labor, capital and education as inputs. Under central
planning, resources are exclusively allocated to farm production, resulting in resource mis-
allocations. As restrictions relaxed, farm households respond by allocating inputs towards
nonfarm production. The model assumes that household production takes capital, labor
and education as input. The model shows the channel through which education might have
an effect on earnings. In particular, the model yields two major predictions: (1) Control-
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ling for initial endownments, the allocations of capital and labor are positively related to
education; (2) Controlling for allocative decision (i.e. when all rural households make the
same allocations between work in agriculture and nonagriculture), better educated farm
households make greater profits.
The approach, taken in this study to evaluate the effect of education, differs previous
studies in two ways. First and foremost, I am not only concerned with how much the return
of education to output, but I am also concerned with how education might affect earnings.
To a larger extent, this study seeks to understand the mechanism(s). Previous studies are
silent on this issue. Second, on obtaining the total effect of education on earnings, I consider
a new methodology that uses both regression analysis and direct calculations. I am not only
concerned with measuring the magnitude of the direct effect of education on household’s net
profits, but I am also concerned with the magnitude of indirect effect education has on net
profits through augmenting capital and labor allocation. Multiplying these two products
will give us full information about what the importance of education is in household net
profits.
In section 4, I use CHIP (China Household Income Project) 2002 to explore how ed-
ucation impact households’ net profits and to identify how much the allocative effect of
education can account for difference in income. The results suggest an additional year of
education is associated with 2.5 percent increase in net profits: Approximately 1.1 percent
from improvement in efficiency in labor allocation and 0.35 percent from labor allocation.
The rest 1 percent reflects education as an input factor in production.
The study here has potentially important implications, suggesting that education is an
important element in facilitating China’s reforms on sectoral allocation. Given that the key
to the success of China’s reforms rest on sectoral movement and in light of the recent decline
in school quality in rural areas, public attention to educational infrastructure investment is
imperative. As well, that highest education is the most relevant in terms of increasing net
profits. The study also sheds light on how schooling might be financed.
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the policy reforms that
set the background of this study; section 3 discusses the framework and illustrates how
predictions of the study are generated; section 4 describes the data used for the empirical
analysis; section 5 shows the empirical results and discusses their implications, and section
6 concludes.
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2 Policy Reforms in China
This section outlines the institutional changes that shape the background of this study.
Instead of offering an exhaustive description of how reforms were operated in China, I
highlight three things: (1) why and how resources were misallocated under central planned
system; (2) how reforms came into being in rural China; (3) and where it is heading.
2.1 The Mao’s Legacy and Rural Institutions Prior to Reforms
Any story of China’s reforms cannot be completed with a reference from Mao. Devasted
by a century of turmoil and wars, the China that the Communists took over in 1949 was a
desperately poor agrarian economy with hardly industrial assets. Nearly 90 percent of the
population lived in rural areas, toiling on small plots of land using century old labor inten-
sive farming technology. As the economy started to recover, the new government swirtly
adopoted a Soviet-style, heavy industry oriented development strategy in 1952. To fund
rapid industrialization, agricultural productivity had to be raised quickly in order to free
up resources for industrial development(see Mao (1977, 5:196-97)).
Starting in 1953, at the urging of the central government, local cadres, eager to demon-
strate their revolutionary zeal, rushed to create cooperatives. Ultimately, by January, 1958,
the government amalgamated smaller cooperatives into 26,500 people communes, with each
encompassing thousands of households. Believing that the collectivization drive had solved
China’s food problem permanently, the government diverted a large amount of rural labor
force from agriculture to industry. The madness of transforming China into an industrial-
ized economy reached the climax in 1959, when local cadres responded by making wild and
baseless claims about grain yields and rural households would rush to operate backyard iron
furnaces by melting their utensils1. Since the diverted rural labor to industry were usually
more productive than those who stayed behind, agricultural output plumetted. A fall in
labor productivity due to insufficient supply of grains, coupled with the lack of foreign as-
sistance, lead to the famous Great Famine (1959 - 1961) where a reported 4 million people
were killed.
After the Famine, the government reinforced the importance of grain production by
introducing commune system and grain quotas. Under the commune system, grain produc-
1Rong Chang (1999) has a fascinating story in her book Wild Swan.
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tion was carried in a unit of 50 households. Households have no responsibility to produce
more than meeting the quotas. Therefore, incentives to innovate is weak. Rural indus-
tries remain subsidary to agirculture, emphasizing five small industries: iron, steel, cement,
chemical fertilizer, hydroelectric power and farm implements. At the dawn of reforms in
1978, only 7 percent of the people are employed in the rural industries. Due to restrictions,
return to capital and labor is high.
2.2 Growing out of Plan: Agricultural Reforms and Industrial Reforms
Starting in 1978, a set of policies were implemented that aims at increasing the productivity
in agricultural productivity. The set of policies includes: The implementation of Household
Responsibility System and the liberalization of markets. Contrasting to the Eastern Eu-
ropean and Soviet experiences, reforms in China were very much carried out in way of
small-scale experiments. It is like Crossing the river by touching the stones. One of the
most famous examples is the Household Registration System (HRS). The implementation
of household responsibility system is, by and large, incidental. In 1978 when the rest of
the Chinese rural areas were operating under the collective farming system, in Fengyang
county of Anhui Province, several households in a village began to contract with the local
government for delivering fixed quota of grain in exchange for farming on a household ba-
sis. The practice was imitated by other counties in the province. By 1984, almost all the
farm households across China had adopted this method. This institutional change induced
strong family work effort, thus reducing the demand for workers on small Chinese farms.
More importantly, the household responsibility system enabled individuals to have increased
command over their productive resources. During the same period, the government also
implemented reforms in production planning in which the state reduced the number of pro-
duction planning targets. Of the remaining targets, few were mandatory and many were
guided by complementary prices and incentive schemes (Sicular, 1988). Therefore, farmers
regain some freedom in adjusting allocation of productive resources to maximize the profits
by cutting costs and raising sales.
In consequence, price adjustments injected a large amount of funds into the rural econ-
omy, which created a demand for industrial products and supplied the flow of funds to
capital investment, especially nonagricultural production. Liberalization of rural markets
not only accommodated the sales of nonagricultural products, but also facilitated the pur-
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chase of inputs for nonagricultural activities. By the mid 1980s, the economic basis for
accelerated growth in rural industries was already embedded in China’s rural economy.
Inputs and outputs markets had emerged; households were conscious of their alternative
opportunities; and they had incentives to allocate resources that will ultimately generate
higher returns2.
It is well known that agricultural reform was the first reform success in China. But a
bigger achievement lies elsewhere; in fact, most of the growth in 1990s came from nonagri-
cultural sector, especially the industrial sector subsequent to agricultural reforms. By 1993,
agriculture is only 15 percent of the total GDP, about the same level as that in former Soviet
Union in 1980s. The second pillar of institutional change concerns the the development of
nonagricultural firms, in particular, the rural firms called Township and Village enterprises
(TVEs).
The TVEs are not state-owned firms nor private firms. They are local public firms
controlled by community governments. To understand why TVEs have emerged and gained
popularity, one has to understand the background. Starting in 1979, China started to
devolve government authority from central to local government levels, the latter includes
provinces, prefectures, counties, townships and villages. As a result, the local governments
bore the responsibility for local interests. One would be curious why TVEs, instead of
private enterprises came into prominence. In the absence of property rights and a credit
market, the hyprid ownership of TVEs provides local government immunity to the possible
predatory from state-owned firms. It also gives them opportunity to innovate through its
close relationship with the state-owned companies. It is as also more possible for firms
obtain credits from major banks given its close tie with the local government. Because of
the typical structure of TVEs, they thrived as a result of policy reforms3
The development of local rural business or the so-called Township and Village Enter-
prises has been unexpected, even by Chinese reformers themselves. Between 1979 and 1993,
the share of TVEs in the national industrial output expanded from 9 percent to 27 per-
cent, while the share of rural private enterprises increased from 0 to 9 percent. Combining
2This view is supported by the empirical findings of Putterman (1993), who analyzed intersectoral factor
allocation in five production teams of Dahe Township in Hebei province. The study suggests that, in 1985,
the marginal productivity of capital and labor in the noncrop sector exceeded the levels in the cropping
sector, indicating overallocation of resources in agriculture.
3Qian and Che (1994, 1998, 1999) provides a fascinating documentation on this account.
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TVEs and private enterprises, rural industries as a whole produced 36 percent of national
industrial output and employ about 123 million people, accounting for about one-half of the
nonagricultural employment nationalwide. All together, these dramatic changes in policies
and in farmers’ responses marked the beginning of sustained expansion in nonagricultural
activities.
2.3 Where the Reforms are Heading?
As reforms deepen, a set of drawbacks emerged. The most notable is still restrictions on
labor migration between rural and urban areas. Chinese households are operated under
the hukou4 (household registration) system. This system identifies a person as a residence
of an area. Previously, a person seeking nonagricultural employment in urban areas would
have to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make
such a move was tightly controlled. Rural households will lose their land title should they
migrate. For those who successfully migrate, they are not entitled to employer provided
health care and housing, education for their children and grain ration, etc.
Historically, with her large population, Chinese hukou limited mass migration from the
land to cities to ensure some structural stability. By regulating labor in such a way, it
ensured the supply of low cost labor to the plethora of state-owned business when needed.
Nevertheless, with her accession to the WTO, China sees the pressure to embrace a reform
that will ultimately liberalize the movement of all factor inputs.
3 An Analytic Framework
3.1 An Economic Model of Household Maximization
To better understand the mechanisms through which interventions lead to distortions in
factor allocations and how education might influence farm households allocation decisions,
I set up a farm household model with two activities: agricultural production and nonagri-
cultural activities.
4The origin of hukou was initially invented by Guan Zhong, the Prime Minister of Qi state in 7th century,
BC originally intended for convenience in taxation and conscription policies on different areas. In the book
of Lord Shang, Shang Yang also described his policy banning immigration and emigration. Xiao He, the
first Chancellor of the Han Dynasty, added the chapter of Hu as one of the nine basic laws of Han and
established the Hukou system as the basis of tax revenue and conscription.
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Let us consider a static profit maximization problem, in which a representative house-
hold i’s return depends on both agricultural and nonagricultural productions:
yj = fj(kj , lj , e)
I have omitted land as an input factor to focus what is crucial the analysis in this study. In
the empirical analysis, I will incorporate the role of land. As is standard in the literature,
I assume that production function f is concave in all arguments and input factors are
complementary to each other. Subscript j ∈ (a, na), where a represents agriculture activities
and na represents noagricultural activities. k and l represent capital investment, labor
supply and inputs purchased by rural households. e denotes education. household chooses
kj , lj , and e to maximize net profits:
max
kj ,lj ,e
V (kj , lj , e) =
2∑
j=1
Pjfj(kj , lj , e)−
2∑
j=1
(wjlj + rjkj) (1)
The first term of equation (2),
∑2
j=1 Pjfj(kj , lj , x, e), is the total revenue of rural house-
hold production. The second term
∑2
j=1(wjlj + rjkj) is referred to the cost of production.
Several assumptions are made to facilitate interpretation as well as to capture the most
relevant aspects of the Chinese economy.
First, I assume all factors of input are fixed in supply in the short term:
ka + kna = 1
la + lna = 1 (2)
I normalize the total capital and labor for the ease of display. It also provides directions for
varibales construction in the empirical analysis: kna and lna are the shares of capital and
labor, respectively. In the case of capital investment, this assumption will be valid as long
as borrowing from outside is absent or at least very costly. Given that credit market is still
undergoing transformation in rural China, it is reasonable to think of rural households as
constrained by the availability of credits in the short run. In terms of labor, it is reasonable
to think of households’ labor supply is constrained by household size in the short run5.
5One potential concern with fix labor supply is that hiring labor may become increasingly inexpensive. I
argue here that it is not likely to crucially change the conclusion of the paper. As family labor is abandunt
due to increase in agricultural productivity. As a robustness check, I will restrict the sample to those who
does not employ outside labor in the empirical analysis.
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Although farmers are not able to change the amount of factors of input in the short run,
they can adjust the allocations of each of the input factors.
That resources are fixed in supply is, by no means, a modest simplication. In this pa-
per, I do not systematically examine the accumulation of capital, in particular, although
various researchers have emphazied the importance it plays in China’s rapid development
(see Chow (1993)). In practise, the way in which assets are distributed during the decol-
lectivization period relies on a range of family backgrounds. From the theoretical point of
view, incoporating these assumptions requires a different modelling strategy.
The household’s maximization problem can be solved explicitly given certain functional
form (i.e., Cobb-Douglas function). Solving equation (1) subject to equation (2) gives us a
standard optimization solution under perfectly competitive market assumption:
l∗na = l(p, w, r, e)
k∗na = k(p, w, r, e)
While these optimal solutions can be used as a reference in studying farm household behavior
in rural China, they have not taken into consideration that rural households in China
still cannot adopt the optimal choices of labor and capital investment in the presence of
restrictions. This is a particular case in terms of labor. Up to date, rural households in
China are constrained from migration for two obvious reasons. First, land per farm in China
is limited. Therefore, households who leave the countryside may risk losing their land title6,
implying that labor is overemployed in the agricultural sector. Second, as pointed out in
section 2, Chinese residents are operated under a Registration system to which benefits of
education and health care are linked. Therefore, the risk of losing one’s benefit and not
being able to obtain it elsewhere outside his/her residence forms another constraint, further
implying that labor may be overemployed in the agricultural sector. Taken together, the
following relationship holds:
l∗na > lna (3)
where l∗na is the optimal choice of labor in nonagricultural sector and lnf is the labor alloca-
tion decisions under labor restrictions. Equation (3) implies that capital in nonagricultural
6Previous studies (see Zhao (1997, 1999)) have examined the role of land in rural labor migration to cities
as rural households will lose their land title if they migrate.
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sector is underinvested according to the assumptions of complementarity between input




Again, k∗na is the optimal choice of capital in nonagricultural sector without restrictions and
knap is the choice of capital allocation under restrictions.
At this point, we have completed the full characterization of the Chinese rural economy.
It involves maximizing the representative household’s net profit, equation (1), subject to
equations (2) - (4). The solutions to this problem can be implicitly expressed as a function
of exogenous variables: p, w, r, and e. Formally, for household i we have:
kinap = k(pi, wi, ri, ei)
linap = l(pi, wi, ri, ei) (5)
Ultimately, we are intersted in how education of household i is related to his/her net
profits. To obtain an expression of this effect7, we substitute equation (5) into equation
(1). To do this, we would like to see how exactly education is related to net profits.
The expression is given by Vi(k(pi, wi, ri, ei), l(pi, wi, ri, ei), e). From here, we can see that
education is not only related to net profits directly, but also through capital and labor.
Total differentiating Vi(k(pi, wi, ri, ei), l(pi, wi, ri, ei), e), we should be able to see education
have an influece on net profits: One comes from education itself, the other through capital

















Equation (6) provides the general framework for the estimation. In particular, we are
interested in three terms in this equation. The last term ∂Vi∂ei captures the productive effect
of education on household net profits. It is the focus of previous studies that seperately









. These two terms captures the main deviation
of this study from others. It suggest that education may have an impact on net profits









Before moving to the discussion of methodology used for estimating the seperate effect
7Appendix discusses in more details on the solutions.
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> 0. It is well









should vanish to 0. That is to say, any effect that e, education has on
the endogenous variables k and l should be reflected on education’s sole effect on net profits
- a small tightening or relaxing of it should have no effect on the solution. However, as
discussed in the setup of the model, the presence of restrictions on labor mobility and land









> 0. Given that the net profit function V (k, l, e) is
assumed to be concave in all arguments, ∂Vi∂kinap > 0 and ∂Vi∂l
i
nap > 0. As a result,
equation (6) is positive by assumption.
3.2 Methodology
This previous subsection suggests a framework used for estimating the effect of education.
This subsection discusses the methodology. Specifically, I am interested in how to disset
the effect of education on net profits that comes from its augmention on labor and capital








, and the effect it has on net profit through
total output (productive effect): ∂Vi∂ei .
One way to tackle this is to employ a Two Stage Least Square Estimates8, in which
I estimate the effect of education on the allocation of non agricultural capital and labor
seperately in the first stage by controlling for factor endowments. The equations estimated
are:
capitalshare = α + β1(factorendowment) + β2(education) + ΦX
laborshare = δ + γ1(factorendowment) + γ2(education) + ΦX (7)
where capital share and labor share are proxies used for allocation of resources. Factor
endowments includes: household fix capital stock, the size of family work force and land.
They control for household endowments. ΦX9 represents a vector of controls: household
size, the average number of durables, whether the household is located in an area has a road,
8It is important to note that, while I will continue to refer to my estimation strategy as a two stage least
square estimation, that does not connote anything about instrumentation. What is done here is simply a
mechanical adjustment to generate the effect of education on factor allocation.
9The set of control should be identical for both estimations in equation (7), given that they are both run
at the same individual level. The similar rationale is applie to estimating the net profit function.
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geographic conditions (plain/hilly/mountainous), whether the community of the household
lives has elementary schools, and so forth - that may affact the allocation of capital and
labor. β2 and γ2 captures the effect of education on capital and labor, respectively. Equation
(7) will run for all individuals i. The estimated coefficients on the effect of education on









Our ultimate interest is to estimate the net profit function and to establish a relationship
between net profit for household i and his/her eduation ei. Given that our ultimate interest
lies in dissecting the effect of education on household net profits, I estimate the following
equation:
netprofit = ρ + ν1(factorendowment) + ν2(capitalshare) + ν3(laborshare)
+ν4(education) + ΦX (8)
To see how we may be able to obtain the estimates of the education that comes from
adjusting factor inputs and total output seperately, we substitute equation (7) in (8) for
capital share and labor share, respectively. This gives us the following expression:
netprofit = ρ + ν1(factorendowment) + ν2(α + β1(factorendowment) + β3education)
+ν3(δ + γ1(factorendowment) + γ2(education))
+ν4(education) + ΦX (9)
From equation (9), with a slight rearrangement, it is easy to identify the coefficients of
interest. The coefficient of factor endowments is given by ν1 + ν2β1 + ν3γ3. The effect
of education that comes from augmenting capital is given by ν2β2 and that comes from
augmenting labor is given by ν3γ3. The direct impact of education is estimated by ν4. This
suggests that the combined effect of education on net profit can be calculated as:
∂V
∂e
= ν2β2 + ν3γ3 + ν4 (10)
Before moving on to the data and results, it is worth briefly discussing how the methodology
used here is different from that of the exisiting literature. There are two basic difference.
First, the approach taken here will not only allow me to capture the total effect of educa-
tion on net profits, but it also enables me to seperately evaluates the effects coming from
augmenting factor inputs and output, as reflected on net profits. Previous studies gener-
ally evaluate returns to education seperately for agricultural and nonagricultural sectors.
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In this case, ν4 is the coefficient of their interest. If education is related to net profits
through augmenting factor inputs, previous studies tend to underestate this effect. Second,
the framework above clearly has implication regarding how education might be related to
households’ net profit. As a result, my study does not only present a new approach of esti-
mation, but it also improves our understanding on an important question: How the better
educated might be better off.
4 Data
The analysis here is run using both individual-level and household-level microdata in rural
China. The dataset is called China Household Income Project (CHIP). The complete project
on rural household consists of three cross-sectional survey in 1988, 1995 and 2002. I make
primary use of the third wave in 2002. The survey in 2002 covers 22 provinces10, 9200
households and 37,969 individuals in total. The rural survey is derived from a larger sam-
ple of the National Rural Household Survey conducted by National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS). The survey is implemented using a three-stage stratified and systematic sampling
method. In the first stage, counties are selected from each provinces; villages are drawn
from counties; and finally households.
The CHIP 2002 provides detailed information on the sector and types of the employ-
ment. Working individuals are asked to provide information whether they are primarily
engaged in agricultural production and if so, how they spend the time among different
agricultural tasks. Similarly, for those who are employed in nonagricultural sector (self-
employed and wage employment), they are asked the primary employment sectors. There
are 17 categories: husbandry, forestry, fishery, cropping, minining, industry, constructions,
communication, wholesales, etc. Consistent with the definition of agriculture in China, I
group people who are primarily employed and work in forestry, fishery, cropping as agri-
cultural labor. Therefore, nonagricultural labor is calculated by subtracting the family
workforce by agricultural labor. Household net profits are calculated as the income from
both agricultural and nonagricultural activities net of the production costs.
There mainly two types of productive capital: agricultural capital and nonagricultural
10The provinces covered in the survey is Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi,
Shangdong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shangxi, Gansu.
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capital. Agricultural capital includes daft animals, large and medium-size farming tools and
equipments, while nonagricultural capital includes industrial machinery, transportation ma-
chinery, construction machinery and storage space. The survey also records the number of
durables each household has. Land is reported as cultivated land.
The CHIP reports education in two ways. It asks all household members the years
of education as well as the level of completion. It also reports the school performance of
the working individuals, which allows for control on school quality. Table 1 reports the
summary statistics. Panel A reports real per capita net profits and other factor inputs.
One notable features is that net profits and production capital stock have large standard
deviations, with net profits ranging from −283.25 to 35225.33 and fixed productive capital
0 to 180. Share of nonagricultural fix productive capital reveals the same pattern. This
suggests that these variables are generally much nosier than the rest. Without linearization,
raw data regression may produce estimates that are misleading (i.e., the regression may be
overwhelmed by the noisy variables). Panel B thus compares the summary statistics of the
loglinearized variables with raw data. Panel C reports the schooling and experiences of
working household members.
5 Empirical Results
This section discusses the empirical results, using the methodology discussed in section 3.2.
There are several issues that are worth discussing before I move on to the empirical results.
First is concerned with the measurement of education. I follow Yang (1997) to use the high-
est education in the household as a proxy for education. This approach is consistent with
that family members have incentives to share information with each other. As a result, the
highest educated one will play the most important role. As a robustness check, I consider
other measures of education, such as average and household head education.
The second is concerned with omitted variables. Unfortunately, I do not have a panel
data that follows the same individuals over time. In this case, my results on interpreting
the relationship between education and net profits may be driven by some omitted factor.
For example, an individual from a wealthier family may have a better chance of going to
school and completing school. This kind of relationship may not be possible to observe in
a cross section data. In the absence of such an individual-level panel where I could follow
14
individual over time, this could be a difficult issue to solve.
In the following section, I focus on two tests. The first test concerns the effect of educa-
tion on labor and capital allocation. The second calculates the combined effect of education
on household net profits. The third subsection deals with omitted variable problems by
focusing on county level analysis.
5.1 Estimating the Allocative Effect of Education
This section estimates equation (7) for capital and labor. On obtaining the estimates of
the effect of education, the dependent variables are the logarithm of the share of nonagri-
cultural labor in family workforce, and the logarithm of the share of nonagricultural capital
in total fixed productive capital. I also compare the results with using different proxies
for allocation: the logarithm of nonagricultural labor, and the logarithm of nonagricultural
capital. Dependent variables includes a set of factor endowments: fixed production capital
stock, total family workforce, and cultivated land per capita, all in logarithm. I used years
of schooling for education for two reasons. First, using educational level tends to overstate
the effect of education at the lower education level and understate it at the higher education
level. For example, an individual drops-outs may understate their education, while those
who stay at school will report the opposite. Using years of education can partially alliviate
this problem. Second, a continuous measurement of education makes interpretation easier
(i.e. the marginal effect of education).
Table 2 summarizes the results on labor allocation. Column (1) - (3) uses the absolute
number of labor in nonagriculture as dependent variable while column (4) - (6) uses share
of nonagricultural labor. The variables of interest are the education coefficients. All regres-
sions includes a provincial dummies to capture any effect that we miss due to the limitation
of the data. I show regression with different measures of education. Among all measures
of education, only regression that uses highest education in the household is significant.
The effect of highest education on the allocation of labor ranges from .0413 to .0516 (all
significant at 1 percent level), implying that increasing education by 1 year is associated
with 4.13 - 5.16 percent increase in laborforce moving from agricultural to nonagricultural
sector. A potential problem is that the result might be driven by outliers. As a robustness
check, I run regressions dropping one province at a time. I find that the effect of highest
education is of similar magnitude. Reckoning section 3.2, table 1 provides estimate of γ2,
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which is the coefficient on highest education.
Table 2 also shows that all variables have their expected signs: The negative sign on
land is consistent with previous studies that land does pose a constraint on movement of
labor out of agriculture, while 1 percent increasing total workforce is associated with around
50 percent increase in labor moving from agriculture to nonagriculture. The negative sign
on the workforce in the nonagricultural labor share regression is mainly due to the use of
total workforce as a denominator. In general, both regressions should reconcile (I run a
seperate regression for nonagricultural labor in order to show how total laborforce is related
to changes in nonagricultural labor).
In both regressions for capital and labor, experiences do not seem to influence intersec-
toral allocation decision. The signs on both experiences and its quadratic term are negative
and insignificant both in magnitude and statistically. This suggests that older households
with the same schooling experience is less likely to work in nonagricultural sector - a result
consistent with the observation that younger household members prefer leaving the farm
regardless of the experience.
Table 3 shows the estimates for capital by running the same regressions as labor. The
effect of education on capital allocation ranges from .0097 to .011, implying that increasing
education by 1 years is associated with 0.97 percent to 1.1 percent increase in capital mov-
ing from agriculture to nonagriculture. This is the measure of β2 in section 3.2. To some
extend of surprise, any increase in capital stock is almost devoted to nonagricultural use
given that the coefficient of total fixed capital stock is around 1.
Results in table 2 - 3 generally suggest that education does utilize the allocation of fac-
tor inputs. The results are also consistent with prior belief that highest farm education is
the most important education variable in explaining efficiency and that there is centralized
decision making on the farms where the households utilize all available human resources. I
now turn to estimating the total effect of education.
5.2 Estimating the Total Effect of Education
Table 4 reports the results for the net profit function (8). Column (1) of table 4 shows the
baseline estimates without control for allocation of labor and capital. Column (2) takes into
account of allocation decisions. Column (3) presents the full set of controls with a focus on
comparing the effect of highest education and average education.
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The results suggest that land, labor and capital all contribute to household’s net profits,
although increasing family laborforce seems to reduce profits without controlling for labor
and capital share in nonagricultural sector and its effect is quite insignificant even after
controls for these factor allocations. Our interest is to examine how factor allocation is
related to household’s net profits. These coefficients correspond to ν2 and ν3 in equation
(8). The results suggest that 10 percent increase in the share of labor in nonagricultural
sector is associated with 2.7 percent increase in net profits. Similarly, a 10 percent increase
in the share of capital in nonagricultural sector is associated with 0.3 percent increase in
net profits.
In addition to facilitating allocation of capital and labor to nonagricultural activities, ed-
ucation also influence net profits directly to capture other aspects of their effect on earnings.
In all regressions shown in table 4, the coefficients of highest education ranges from .0109
to .0120 and are significant at 1% level. This suggests that 1 year increase in education is
associated with 1.1 percent increase in net profits. This measure corresponds to coefficient
ν4 in equation (8). Average education of household members has significant influence on net
profits as well, but remain second order to highest education, saying that 1 years increase in
overall education increases net profits by 0.6 percent. Consider a household of 5 people in
general, this means a total five years increase of education to achieve a 0.6 percent increase
in net profits.
Table 2, 3 and 4 provides estimates that enable us to directly calculate the effect of
education on households’ net profits. In order to do this, we make use of equation (10):
∂V
∂e = ν2β2 + ν3β3 + ν4, where ν2 is the coefficient of capitalshare in column (2) of table 4;
β2 is measure the impact of education on capitalshare in column (4) of table 3; ν3 is the
coefficient of laborshare in column (2) of table 4; β3 is effect of eduation on laborshare. ν4
measures the direct effect of education in net profits.
Table 5 replicates columns from table 2 - 4. The variables of interest are in bold format.
Column (1) replicates column (2) of table 4. Column (2) is taken from column (4) of table 2
and column (3) resembles column (4) of table 3. The calculation yields the following results:
Effect coming from labor allocation is (.0413)× (.2686) = 1.1%; effect from capital is given
by (.0097) × (.0364) = 0.035%. The direct effect of education is given by .0109 = 1.09%.
The total effect of education on net profits can be obtained by summing up the three ef-
fects, yielding 1.1% + .035% + 1.09% = 2.23%. That says, an additional year of education
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increases households’ net profits by 2.23 percent, out of which the effect of education on
labor allocation is the strongest. This is consistent with the one-to-one movement between
income growth and nonagricultural labor observed in Figure 1.
6 Conclusion
This study uses cross-sectional data from rural China to investigate the possible sources and
determinants of variation in income in rural China. It is hypothesized that education plays
a critical role in facilitating resources allocations and previous studies tend to overlook this
effect. The findings here suggest that education does play a critical role in raising efficiency
in rural households in respond to changing market conditions. Under policy interventions,
better educated household are not only more productive, but also able to make better al-
locative decisions in terms of working and investing in nonfarm activities. As such, they
are able to rip bigger profits.
It is worth noting the possible policy implications that may come out of the study. The
central planned-system created massive misallocation of resources within the rural sector
and across rural-urban regions. While past reforms has greatly improved allocative efficiency
within rural economy, China is still facing long-term, arduous structural adjustments across
the sectors. Mobility of resources will be the key aspect of this process; consequently rural
schooling will have a high value during the transition. In view of the fact that the conditions
of many rural schools have deteriorated during recent institutional changes, public attention
and investment in infrastructure is imperative. To a large extent, this study of rural China
also mirror the experiences of other developing countries, in which rural people must face
the selection of income activities and the prospect of leaving agriculture. Education plays
a critical role in these allocative decisions for raising incomes in the current period as well
as for the future.
Second, a little bit further, this study provides evidence on the composition of demand for
education in rural households. In particular, that only highest education within the house-
holds matters may have potentially important implication regarding how schooling should
be financed: focusing on a few with available resources rather than providing universal
schooling may improve efficiency, which in turn translates into higher profits. With cer-





This section discusses a general solution to the economic model of household profit max-
imization in section 3. A representative rural household maximizes his/her net profit by
choice of agricultural capital ka and nonagricultural capital kna, agricultural and nonagri-
cultural labor, la and lna, respectively. Prices of outputs and costs of inputs are assumed
to be exogenous. Education choice e is predetermined :
max
ka,la,kna,lna
[pafa(ka, la, e)− (wala + raka)] + [pnafna(kna, lna, e)− (wnalna + rnakna)
subject to the resource constraint:
ka + kna = 1
la + lna = 1
By standard Lagrangean method, we can rewrite the problem as if it is an unconstrained
maximization problem by substituting ka with 1− kna. The same method applies to labor.
Here is the revised problem:
max
kna,lna
pafa(1− kna, 1− lna, e)− [wa(1− lna) + ra(1− ka)]+[pnafna(kna, lna, e)−(wnalna+rnakna)
Under normal circumstances, meaning in a world without further restrictions, solving the
above maximization problem shall give us the optimal choice of k∗na and l
∗
na. As in section
3.1, we express them in terms of exogenous variables, p, w, r, and e. But rural households
in China still cannot adopt the optimal choices above for various reasons, most notably
restrictions on labor mobility. We thus imposes another two constraints. The left hand side
states that choices should be made positive (i.e., no rational beings will throw resources
away). The right hand side captures the idea stated above.
0 < lna < l∗na
0 < kna < k∗na
Therefore, the problem is an inequality constraint maximization problem. Usual Lagrangean
methods still applies. However, instead of getting the standard first order conditions. We
obtained two sets of conditions called the Complementary Slackness Conditions. Our ulti-
mate goal is not to obtain the exact solutions of the whole problem, but rather to infer the
comparative statics (i.e. how one variable is related to the other). The Lagrangean is given
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as follows, where the multiplier of the constraints are called the shadow prices. They have
interesting interpretation in economics: they measure the changes in one variable given the
trivial changes in the other. As a result, λ and µ will be zero if everything is made at the
optimun (i.e., nothing can be made better/worse). If choices are made below the optimum,
meaning that something can be made better. In this case, the shadow prices will be strictly
positive (µ > 0 and λ > 0) (i.e., a reward for getting better). The Lagrangean is given as
follows:
L = pafa(1− kna, 1− lna, e)− [wa(1− lna) + ra(1− ka)] + [pnafna(kna, lna, e)− (wnalna + rnakna)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V,netprofits
+λ(l∗na − lna) + µ(k∗na − kna)



















Since the first term in the parenthesis are positive, k∗na − kna > 0 and l∗na − lna > 0.
This means that the terms that they multiply must equal to zero.










Given λ > 0 and µ > 0, we know the marginal profits of labor and capital, the terms
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Figure 1: Growth in Net Income, Nonagricultural Income and Nonagricultural Labor
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996, 2003, 2006 and China Statistical Yearbook of Rural
Survey, 2006
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Net Profits and Production Inputs
Mean Stardard Deviation Min Max
Net Real Profits 2707.772 2267.41 −283.25 35225.33
Cultivated Land 4.6475 4.8689 0 180
Productive Capital 1180.996 3586.24 0 198365
Household Size 4.3894 1.2355 0 11
Family Workforce 2.5819 1.2062 0 8
Nonagr. Labor 1.1736 .9541 0 5
Nonagr. Labor Share 48.5667 34.7866 0 100
Nonagr. Capital 685.2171 3393.429 0 198115
Nonagr. Capital Share 42.1569 36.5100 0 100
Panel B: Net Profits and Production Inputs (Log Transformation)
Net Real Profits 3.3304 .2969 1.301 4.5469
Cultivated Land .5970 .3305 -1.3010 2.2553
Productive Capital 2.7676 .5556 1 5.2974
Household Size .6245 .1269 0 1.0414
Family Workforce .3909 .1862 0 .9031
Nonagr. Labor .1474 .1884 0 .6990
Nonagr. Labor Share 1.7489 .1990 1.1549 2
Nonagr. Capital 2.5171 .6016 .8539 5.2969
Nonagr. Capital Share 1.6543 .3426 −.2788 2
Panel C: Schooling and Experiences of Working Household Members
Highest Education 9.1541 2.2018 0 18
Average Education 6.7900 1.7954 0 14.3333
Household Head Education 7.2449 2.5129 0 16
Average Experience 34.7878 20.696 0 182
Panel A reports the raw data summary statistics; panel B is the logarithm transformation of Panel A.
Panel C contains basic schooling information. Experience is calculated by subtracting working individual’s
age with schooling years and 7, the age of enrollment.
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Table 2: Estimating the Demand of Nonagricultural Labor
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables
log(nalabor) log(share.nalabor)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(land) −.06786∗∗∗ −.0614∗∗∗ −.0627∗∗∗ −.0691 −.0635∗∗∗ −.0627∗∗∗
(.0117) (.0116) (.0115) (.0117) (.0116) (.0115)
log(laborforce) .5029∗∗∗ .4939∗∗∗ .4827∗∗∗ −.4970∗∗∗ −.5061∗∗∗ −.5173
(.0216) (.0205) (.0206) (.0216) (.0204) (.0206)
log(capitalstock) −.0046 −.0041 −.0034 −.0041 −.0036 −.0039
(.0062) (.0061) (.0061) (.0062) (.0061) (.524)
highest education .0413∗∗∗ .0516∗∗∗ .0413∗∗∗ .0516∗∗∗
(.0124) (.0150) (.0124) (.0015)
average education .0139 −.0053 (.0140) (−.0053)
(.0108) (.0118) (.0108) (.0118)
hhead education .0026∗∗ −.0003 .0026∗∗ −.0003
(.0024) (.0029) (.0024) (.0029)
Average experience −.0002 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002 −.0002 −.0003
(.0003) (.0004) (.011) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003)
Averageexperience2 4.85e − 6 4.92e − 6 4.24e − 6 4.92e − 6 4.24e − 6 4.85e − 6
(2.30e − 6) (2.31e − 6) (2.31e − 6) (2.50e − 6) (2.31e − 6) (2.30e − 6)
R2 .31 .29 .29 .35 .34 .36
Obs. 17569 17569 17569 17569 17569 17569
All regressions include provincial dummies. Standard errors are in parenthesis and corrected for
intra-village correlation. level. Controls for the regressions are geographic conditions
(hilly/plain/mountainous), whether and when the village has roads, whether the village has junior high
school, the number of minority people.




Table 3: Estimating the Demand of Nonagricultural Capital
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables
log(nacapital) log(share.nacapital)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(land) −.2077∗∗∗ −.2104∗∗∗ −.2123∗∗∗ −.2077 −.2104∗∗∗ −.2123∗∗∗
(.0256) (.02600) (.0260) (.02561) (.02600) (.02603)
log(laborforce) −.0988∗∗ −.0807∗∗ −.1046∗∗∗ −.0988∗∗∗ −.0807∗∗∗ −.1046∗∗∗
(.0396) (.0390) (.0391) (.0396) (.0390) (.0391)
log(capitalstock) .9752∗∗∗ .9688∗∗∗ .9686∗∗∗ −.0988 −.0312∗ −.0314∗∗
(.0168) (.0160) (.0160) (.0168) (.0160) (.0160)
highest education .0097∗∗∗ .0105∗∗∗ .0097∗∗∗ .0105∗∗∗
(.0024) (.0030) (.0024) (.0030)
average education −.0139 −.0649 −.0242 −.0649 ∗ ∗∗
(.0108) (.0118) (.0108) (.0118)
hhead education .0048∗∗ −.0014 .0027∗∗ −.0003
(.0024) (.0029) (.0024) (.0029)
Average experience .0003 .0002 −.0001 .0003 .0002 −.0001
(.0003) (.0002) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
Averageexperience2 −8.48e − 6 −7.96e − 6 −7.01e − 6 −8.48e − 6 −7.96e − 6 −7.01e − 6
(7.09e − 6) (7.13e − 6) (7.05e − 6) (7.09e − 6) (7.13e − 6) (7.05e − 6)
R2 .73 .73 .73 .15 .16 .16
Obs. 16786 16786 16786 16786 16786 16786
All regressions include provincial dummies. Standard errors are in parenthesis and corrected for
intra-village correlation. Controls for the regressions are geographic conditions (hilly/plain/mountainous),
whether and when the village has roads, whether the village has junior high school, the distance to the
nearest junior high schools the number of minority people.




Table 4: Estimating the Net Profits Function
log(netprofits)
(1) (2) (3)
log(land) .0526∗∗∗ .0703∗∗∗ .0754∗∗∗
(.0148) (0.181) (.0179)
log(laborforce) −.1332∗∗∗ .0315 .03111
(.0249) (.0340) (.0337)










average experience −.0017 −.0018 −.0017
(.0005) (.0005) (.0006)
averageexperience2 3.08e− 6 3.22e− 6 2.91e− 6
(3.54e− 6) (4.66e− 6) (4.82e− 6)
R2 .37 .45 .46
Obs. 22165 13055 13055
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Table 5: Calculation of the Total Effect of Education on Net Profits
log(share.nalabor) log(share.nacapital) log(netprofits)
log(land) −.0691 −.2077 .0526
log(laborforce) −.4970 −.0988 −.1332
log(capitalstock) −.0041 −.0988 .0588
log(share.nalabor) .2686
log(share.nacapital) .0364
highest education .0413 .0097 .0109
29
